The term Commonwealth refers to shared prosperity or wealth and is used to describe direct and close cooperation between countries or a country for the mutual benefit of their peoples.
The primary goal of the British Empire’s expansion during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries was commercial interests, seeking new markets for its exports and raw materials for its industries. Simultaneously, the new colonial markets also needed new markets for their exports, import requirements, and developmental needs. This led to the idea of relying on a system of trade exchange, development cooperation, and administrative development among these colonies and protectorates due to their similar administrative, economic, and political systems. This was part of an economic cooperative system project, akin to a closed market between these countries, to exchange and protect member products and meet their developmental needs through investment and administrative contributions to each other’s prosperity, as well as cooperation in other political and international fields.
In the period we are discussing, Sudan was given the opportunity to join the old British Commonwealth with a special status from 1945-1954. This period long preceded the establishment of the current modern Commonwealth or the British Commonwealth of Nations, also known as the Commonwealth countries. The old Commonwealth, which convened before 1945, had limited membership to countries associated with the British Crown, including Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and the provinces of Ireland, Pakistan, and India. During this time, Sudan, compared to other countries that joined later from the British colonies, had made significant progress in administrative, educational, and developmental aspects. It possessed all the elements to benefit from its new peers in building a solid future for its state, with capabilities that would enable it to rapidly compete with major powers in terms of development, economy, and administration through its core membership that was offered to it.
In the present time, with the liberalization of global trade and the opening of closed markets, the term has become more general. It now refers to a political assembly in the form of a voluntary union consisting of 56 countries, all of which were formerly part of the British Empire, with the exception of Mozambique and Rwanda.
The modern Commonwealth includes about one-third of the world’s countries, with a combined population of 2.7 billion people, representing approximately one-third of the global population35. The Commonwealth’s 56 member states encompass some of the world’s richest and poorest nations, as well as some of the largest and smallest in terms of land area13. Of the 56 member countries, 33 are classified as small states (mostly island nations with populations of 1.5 million or less)3.
The United Kingdom supports the Commonwealth’s work in promoting democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights, alongside the organization’s economic and development efforts.
For example, demonstrating the ongoing commitment to integrated cooperation between the old Commonwealth countries and the current modern Commonwealth, we find that even at the time of writing this analysis, countries like Britain and Canada continue to support importing and purchasing products from old Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand at prices much higher than regional or global markets. This is despite the liberalization of the global economy and Britain’s membership in the European market, which allows them to purchase the same product from other markets at much lower or subsidized prices. Conversely, the proportion of exports and imports between Britain and the top ten current modern Commonwealth countries in terms of per capita income does not exceed 4% of Britain’s exports and imports, except with the old core countries. This is from an economic perspective. Administratively, we find that any successful development in the administrative systems of one of its old countries is exchanged and adopted by the core member countries in their administrative or political systems.
During this initial period or the period of cooperation among the old Commonwealth countries that we are discussing here, when this grouping was established, Sudan’s imports did not exceed the volume of its exports, and its administrative expenses did not exceed its local revenues. With an almost complete administrative system compared to its major old members and much better than other countries in the region at the time and globally, Sudan could have, if it had seized this opportunity offered to it with the help of this cooperative grouping, risen to the ranks of Canada, Australia, and South Africa economically and administratively in a short period. It could have become a leading developed economic country by seizing guaranteed and supported markets for its limited products and unlimited support in various administrative and developmental fields. Also, due to its limited population and the nature of its economy at the time, which did not depend on imports compared to the presence of developmental wealth ready for investment to support its exports, its membership would have enabled it to exploit the conditions that compel that membership to invest in it. It would have been the most attractive for capital from them due to the presence of a civil and administrative service known for its efficiency, capable of development and absorbing the requirements of development and industrial and agricultural investments compared to the old colonies and countries of the region.
It is not surprising that we see all the countries that gained independence long after Sudan rushed to join it, and even today, many countries, including European Union countries, are seeking to obtain its membership, even the new state of South Sudan, which has requested membership.
Why didn’t Sudan join?
To answer why Sudan did not seize the historic opportunity to join the British Commonwealth despite its clear desire to do so long before independence, I will leave it to the researcher and reader to judge based on the narrative below of British documents related to Sudan, according to the historical sequence I selected directly from the marginal points I noted within my review of the documents contained in the British archives for that era. I preferred to present them verbatim to reflect other aspects regarding the independence era and crucial issues that are at the core of the discussion about joining the British Commonwealth.
August 25, 1945: Proposals of Sudanese parties submitted by the Graduates’ Congress
In a letter from J.W. Robertson to A.C. Haselden referring to the proposals of Sudanese parties submitted by the Sudanese Graduates’ Congress, it was mentioned: “The Sudanese want or seek an independent state that maintains a direct connection with the countries of the Middle East according to the desire and place of Northern Sudan, which has a direct relationship or connection with the British Commonwealth.”
Among the four proposals presented by the government to the Umma and Unionist parties, the Graduates’ Conference, and to the regions and their representatives, which included the following options for Sudan:
Choose full independence, after which they can enter into relations with neighboring countries according to their national interests and others.
Choose to join Egypt, thus making Sudan one of its regions governed by its laws.
Self-government linked to the Egyptian royal crown under a union that chooses the type of its conditions while maintaining or cutting relations with Britain.
Self-government for Sudan in the same position as Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, directly linked to the Commonwealth countries.
December 17, 1950: Parliament vote on self-government
The vote in parliament on self-government was considered a victory for the Sudanese desire for the presence of British administration, despite the majority of its members being from the Umma Party that called for it, but won it by a margin of one vote 38-39.
All those who spoke during the voting arguments rejected the idea of the British administration leaving (see Robert Howe’s memo to the British Foreign Office).
November 17, 1951: Proposals of the Republican People’s Party
Sir Robertson referred to McWorth Young’s points when forming the Republican People’s Party, which many believed was a British creation, and its members expressed dismay at that, where they presented signed proposals.
They defined their main points as:
Establishing an independent government at the end of the following year
Giving full freedom to the parliament to determine the date and timing of that
Establishing a democratic republican system in an independent free Sudan
Full membership of Sudan in the Commonwealth countries
The proposal was signed by representatives from various regions of Sudan, including Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, White Nile, Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Red Sea.
Despite initial opposition from some political leaders, the proposals gained support from educated groups, government administration areas in the Gezira projects among workers, and many sheikhs in the Northern region, as well as southern sectors. However, the opposition of Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi unconsciously pushed the Umma Party to oppose the proposals and caused a split in the transitional legislative council at the time.
December 18, 1951: Proposal for an Independent Government within the Commonwealth
Following Dodds-Parker’s memo to Lord Reading regarding the proposal for an independent government within the Commonwealth:
The British Deputy Foreign Secretary commented on December 18, 1951, upon receiving Dodds-Parker’s memo to Lord Reading and party membership proposals, that any decision on Sudan’s status and future would not be made in the near future that year until Sudanese themselves decide their political future and state. Therefore, this would not happen before they announce self-governance and declare their government, possibly by the end of that year. The proposals submitted by a respectable majority of Sudanese and the recent memorandum attached with declared approval from the majority of Sudanese sectors to join the British Commonwealth countries.
The proposal to find a special formula for a new member to join the British Commonwealth countries, which Dodds-Parker referred to in his memo to Lord Reading, is summarized in the following points:
Sudan is clearly inclined towards independence and self-governance, and in his last meeting with representatives of the Independence Party, they expressed their desire for a status within the Commonwealth countries similar to India’s position.
It is clear from the British Foreign Secretary’s speech that Sudanese from all sectors desire a special relationship with the United Kingdom, and even the conservative religious sectors expressed their desire within a proposal that the head of the sovereign state be a Muslim appointed by the British King as suggested by the future Sudanese Prime Minister.
Sudan’s proposal coincides with a proposal from another party, the Gold Coast, which desires a status similar to Canada within the British Commonwealth countries.
Many British colonies are closely watching what will become of Sudan’s status after its independence regarding its connection to the British Commonwealth.
There is a question of whether the United Kingdom is in a position ready to support a new member in the British Commonwealth:
(a) Politically, for example, in case South Africa agrees to it
(b) Economically, for example, finding capital for its development
(c) Constitutionally, there are three obstacles:
(1) Head of State
(2) Foreign relations, defense, and currency
(3) Internal self-governance
Does the British King and Crown accept the proposals regarding the organization of the Commonwealth as suggested by the committee for drafting the constitution of small colonies submitted in August 1951?
Regardless of acceptance or rejection of proposals by the British Crown, can the Ministry of British Commonwealth Countries establish a separate department or sector (such as a British Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Administration, Special Finance Department, and Defense Department) for marketing and structuring institutions of the new state that wishes to join or change its political status within it?
(These questions from the British Deputy Foreign Secretary Anthony Nutting disappointed the hopes of the Sudanese, but they were clearly based on the high cost that would fall on their shoulders, especially given Britain’s financial situation after the war)
After the delegation’s return on July 10, 1952, negotiations took place between Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi and Sir Robertson regarding the best responses to Hilali Pasha’s conditions. However, by that time, Hilali had already resigned from his position.
On the other hand, Hilali Pasha’s proposals faced angry opposition from Sudanese parties, especially Southern Sudanese members of parliament, who considered it proof of Egypt’s intentions to colonize Sudan and of the British weakness and betrayal.
Ultimately, the Sudanese collectively refused to respond to Hilali Pasha’s proposals, despite Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi’s desire to accept some of them.
Hilali Pasha attempted to create discord between the parties’ position and Britain by informing the British that Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi’s delegation, which came to meet him, expressed their rejection of the British proposals presented by the English Governor-General at the time.
November 13, 1952: The issue of sovereignty and head of state or governor-general from the British Colonial Office perspective
In the deliberations that followed between the British Colonial Office and the British Foreign Office, the issue of who would represent the head of state or governor-general was narrowed down in case Sudan chose to enter the British Commonwealth and refused to be in a union with Egypt or nominally remain under the Egyptian crown as Egypt had proposed.
The meeting leaned towards Sudan expressing readiness to accept a representative from India, Pakistan, or Norway, while preferring the choice to be from Sudan.
Egypt preferred in this case for the choice to be from India, but India expressed unwillingness for the type of membership proposed by the Africans. At the same time, South Africa expressed total opposition to the proposal of appointing a representative from India, and the Commonwealth Office agreed with them due to the South African objection and preferred to support a candidate from Pakistan. Britain initially favored this suggestion, but the British Foreign Office was almost certain that the Sudanese preferred the position to be from Sudan, especially since the position gives its representative the right to appoint the judiciary and its judicial course. Therefore, the Egyptian proposal was found impractical and would not be legally accepted by the Sudanese.
Here, the British Foreign Office proposed, after Egypt’s retreat and agreement, that if Sudan chose complete independence from it, the Sudanese would choose the position for the Sovereignty Council. This was accepted by the British as it places the responsibility of choosing Sudan’s political future in the hands of the government following its independence. However, at the same time, it expressed concern that the Sudanese might engage in political battles among themselves, unaware of the importance of the era they were in and the long-term future of their state.
In the meeting, the Foreign Office representative expressed not to raise Egypt’s proposals or change or add to them so as not to provoke Egypt about them. Therefore, he emphasized that the proposal submitted by the Sudanese to join the Commonwealth countries should be decided separately from the Egyptian proposals.
December 18, 1952: Egypt’s evasion and attempts to conclude separate agreements with Sudanese parties
On December 18, 1952, the British Prime Minister pointed out Egypt’s evasion in its agreement with the United Kingdom and its attempts to conclude separate agreements with many Sudanese parties on the basis that they were based on the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. It later became clear that the Egyptian proposals, on which some agreements were concluded with Sudanese parties, including the front of those demanding independence from the Umma Party, presented the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement incomplete and even completely changed their content, which was totally rejected by the group of southern parties in form and substance.
The British Prime Minister expressed his disdain for the superficiality of some Sudanese parties and their gullibility and failure to read the contents of the Egyptian proposals, whose conditions contradict the complete independence of Sudan from Egypt. General Mohamed Naguib even went so far as to present the Sudanese memorandum to the British government, which stipulates Sudan’s option to obtain its independence completely from both Egypt and Britain or any other country, when he deleted the last phrase so that it only reads Sudan’s option for self-governance.
On this basis, the British Prime Minister reaffirmed in his memorandum the British government’s readiness to help Sudan reach complete independence from Britain and Egypt and to support it materially and economically and support it to obtain membership in the British Commonwealth countries whenever a government after independence chooses to do so, cutting off the way for Mohamed Naguib’s memorandum.
Britain’s proposal faced opposition from the South, whose representatives preferred to accept the proposal for Sudan to join the Commonwealth countries before independence from Britain, fearing Egypt and their future within the Egyptian state. However, the British Prime Minister hastened to reassure the Southerners that Britain would ask Egypt to make pledges regarding South Sudan so as not to make Egypt make the issue of the South a matter of Anglo-Egyptian dispute and thus isolate Northern Sudan.
December 23, 1952: The British Cabinet summarizes its position on Sudan’s membership in the Commonwealth countries
On December 23, 1952, the British Cabinet discussed the memorandum presented by Lord Swinton on Sudan’s membership in the British Commonwealth countries.
He indicated that its contents were the points agreed upon between the Foreign Office Secretary and the British Colonial Office regarding Sudan’s expected request to join the British Commonwealth to be presented to the member countries of the Commonwealth and to ascertain their initial position on Sudan’s request.
The inquiry included the points reached by a committee from the Foreign Office and the Colonial Council, which were as follows:
Their agreement in principle that Sudan and its society and political parties at the present time are fully aware and at a good level in managing their state affairs and that its people have a close attachment to the British Commonwealth countries at the present time.
Sudan’s desire and proposal to be an independent state as well as a member of the British Commonwealth countries makes its membership a subject of discussion, especially since other countries in the British colonies are closely watching the acceptance of this proposal or not and following suit in a similar formula to apply for membership in the Commonwealth countries.
The collective desire of the people to join the British Commonwealth countries, including its sectarian parties, but the competition between Sayyid Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi and Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, which is basically a personal competition over their sectarian leadership and the consequences of these differences between the educated groups and tribal clans and political parties belonging to either side and the ethnic difference between its south and north and its economic situation, makes it difficult for Sudan to agree on any agreement on any issue, even if it is the future of their state and its political status.
It is also clear that the acceptance of all Sudanese parties of a good relationship with the British Crown stems from some of their fear of Egyptian influence and the influence of their ideological leaders unless Britain takes practical measures on their behalf to apply for membership in the British Commonwealth countries, which is especially desired by the Southerners and the educated groups from the parties and tribal clan leaders.
From the British government’s point of view, it finds that there is no practical benefit from putting the Sudanese or applying on their behalf for membership in the British Commonwealth countries, although it sees that as being in the interest of good future relations with it, but it would be considered an interference in a decision that is supposed to be made by the independent government later.
Sudan also has nothing to offer politically to the British Commonwealth countries but needs what Britain offers it in case it proceeds to accept the Sudanese desire to enter the membership of the British Commonwealth, which will lose it important strategic and political relations with Egypt and it will become difficult to enter into political agreements with it in the future. Therefore, it is not in Britain’s interest for Sudan to join the British Commonwealth countries at the present time, besides it will complicate its internal political issues and it is advisable to maintain relations that ensure a system of communication and contact with it.
From an economic point of view, Britain’s interest at the present time is represented in buying Sudanese cotton, which depends entirely on Sudan’s reliance on the pound sterling within the membership of dealing with British Commonwealth countries or (the sterling area) whenever it mints its currency after independence. Therefore, Sudan’s entry into the membership of the British Commonwealth countries may guarantee that, but from an economic point of view as well, Sudan’s entry into the British Commonwealth countries will not provide a special status or great benefit for Sudanese exports to Britain. Therefore, Britain’s economic interests in Sudan can be achieved through economic agreements without the need for it to enter within the British Commonwealth group.
7-Contrary to what was mentioned above and in contradiction to strategic interests, the Sudanese people’s desire should be respected if they apply for membership because it would be unacceptable to let them down. In this case, they would see that they expressed the desire to strengthen their relations with Commonwealth countries, and their reaction would be more resentment if their request is rejected. Therefore, their request should be considered seriously and the door should not be closed in their faces now or in the future. Hence, a friendly policy should be adopted in our relations with them, although this contradicts the principles of foreign relations on which the Commonwealth of Nations was founded from the perspective of Commonwealth relations. If Sudan submits its application, it should be considered in terms of its status and not as a request from a country under the British Crown, but as a request from an independent country with full sovereignty.
On this basis, Sudan will not accept membership less than full membership equal to its core members, which will require many obligations from it, including their presence during Cabinet meetings and full coordination with its membership on issues of common interest. In these two points, Sudan in its current state is politically novice and will find it difficult to provide any effectiveness to the Commonwealth.
This is in addition to an important point, which is that Sudan’s request for membership in the Commonwealth cannot be considered without consultation with all its members, including South Africa, which under its current government completely refuses Sudan’s accession to the Commonwealth.
Finally, accepting Sudan’s membership will provoke the sensitivity of the Gold Coast and Nigeria to give them a special status as well, besides it may expose the fragile entity of Commonwealth institutions to radical changes that Britain is not ready for at the present time.
8- The Colonial Office believes that regardless of fears, Sudan’s desire to join the Commonwealth should not be neglected, although it is not a British colony, and it would be unwise in both cases to encourage Sudan to join or not at the same time because it will disappoint the groups that have a desire for special relations with it.
In conclusion, our decision is that Sudan’s membership should not be proposed to the Commonwealth at the present time for the following reasons:
(a) This will lead to opening issues of many countries like the Gold Coast entering with full membership
(b) It is not acceptable to encourage a country that is not a full member of the British colonies or the Commonwealth like Sudan to apply for Commonwealth membership without opening the door to discussing the basic principles of membership.
(c) Sudan has not yet applied for membership and may not do so in the future, so an approach should be adopted not to show interest in what it may decide in case of informal inquiries from it without showing refusal to accept it or not.
January 1, 1953: Call by Mohamed Ahmed Omar of the Sudan Party
Mohamed Ahmed Omar, who founded the Sudan Party and is the owner and editor-in-chief of the weekly news (Sudan Press Agency), called through his party for independence and declaring Sudan a republican state under the British Commonwealth. He later joined the Umma Party where he took over the party propaganda office.
February 20, 1953: The British Prime Minister sends a top secret letter to Robert Howe, the Governor-General, about the British government’s position
British Prime Minister Eden sent a letter marked “Top Secret” by hand carried by the head of the African Department at the British Foreign Office, W. Morris, to the then Governor-General of Sudan, Robert Howe, outlining in it the general British policy for the future of Sudan. The British Foreign Office has not yet released its contents in its documents on the grounds that it did not keep a copy of it in its records.
However, the general content that was disclosed mentioned that he did not believe that Sudan would seek to join the Commonwealth on its own, but that Britain should not openly encourage Sudan to do so lest the Sudanese think that Britain is seeking to continue its presence in Sudan. Also, there are in fact no strategic interests for Britain in Sudan other than direct communication channels with it. Also, our push or support for Sudan to obtain Commonwealth membership may cause us problems with its other members without guarantees of the success of those policies (*)
And any encouragement to it will cause us tension in relations with Egypt, so Britain should confirm to the Sudanese its encouragement for their independence and self-rule, and all indications confirm that the Sudanese look to Britain to support them and provide advice on their affairs, as we must ensure that the relationship and providing advice on their affairs, besides ensuring an equal relationship between Sudan and Egypt for their benefit and perhaps in the future a trilateral relationship between us.
(*) (This paragraph should be read with the seventeen paragraphs or points contained in the letter by researchers in the history of Sudan’s independence)
March 9, 1953: “The fake Sudanese personality” and Governor-General Robert Howe’s vision for the future of relations with Britain
In the meeting held on March 9, 1953, between the British government envoy Sir Grafty Ismith, the Governor-General and Minister of Administrative Rule Sir Geoffrey Howe, and in the presence of the British Prime Minister’s envoy and head of African Affairs at the British Foreign Office W. Morris, Howe expressed in a question about his vision for the future of relations with Sudan whether he preferred just a friendly relationship between it and Britain as requested by the British Prime Minister. He said he preferred a closer relationship for the benefit of the Sudanese in direct connection with Britain and membership for it in the Commonwealth, but he found that this option was no longer desired by Britain for fear of embarrassing Egypt.
However, at the end of that meeting and after extensive discussion, the British government’s vision regarding Sudan’s membership in the Commonwealth was adopted, along with adopting the Governor-General’s proposal that the idea of Sudan’s membership should always remain open and there should be no decisive decision in this regard until the proposal of a Sudanese-British alliance or agreement or bilateral agreement was also excluded so as not to embarrass Egypt.
W. Morris, the foreign affairs official, mentioned upon his return from Sudan in his report on the political situation in Sudan: All the Sudanese leaders he met expressed to him their fear of Egypt’s intention and insisted on concluding a separate agreement with Britain, and they were angry at Britain’s lack of support for their entry into the Commonwealth.
Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Shanqeeti and Abdullah Khalil went to request this directly.
However, W. Morris expressed his surprise that the Sudanese do not understand that Commonwealth membership is their decision and not Britain’s decision, but rather that the situation that Britain initially called for offers Sudan membership exactly like its membership, but at the same time he said that the Sudanese began as if they were ashamed of expressing this openly and their country’s interest, so they initiate talking that they seek independence first and then joining, which he described as the fake Sudanese personality that characterizes them because they do not know that they pushed us to sign an agreement with Egypt that tied our hands from the beginning and now they have to rely on themselves and face their issues with Egypt.
*March 30, 1953: Stormy meeting in Khartoum between General Mohamed Naguib and the British government representative
In a stormy and decisive meeting between General Mohamed Naguib and the British government representative Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who happened to be in Khartoum, the British representative protested against the misleading media and propaganda broadcast by Egypt in Sudan. General Mohamed Naguib accused Britain and its civil service administration in Sudan of being behind more than that, pointing to James Robertson’s statements during his visit to eastern Sudan, where Robertson said that the Sudanese hope to stand as equals to Egypt and gain complete independence from any foreign powers would not happen if they did not join the British Commonwealth1. Robertson replied that he would respond to that later because he first wanted to know why Egypt was trying to accuse Britain of seeking to separate the South from Sudan when Egypt was fully aware that Britain had rejected the separation of the South from Sudan, contrary to the Egyptian proposals in their recent agreement. General Mohamed Naguib quickly claimed that he had not yet met many Southerners and that his representative (*) was prevented from entering southern Sudan.
Robertson Lloyd continued to explain to General Mohamed Naguib that he or anyone from his administration had not advised or encouraged the Sudanese to join the British Commonwealth and that he had answered the same question before the Egyptian and Sudanese press when he repeated that he wanted to see the Sudanese choose what they deemed appropriate for themselves after gaining their independence .
(*) General Mohamed Naguib’s reference to preventing his representative from entering southern Sudan is about the issue of preventing Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Salah El-Din from entering Sudan under the Protection and Movement to Southern Sudan Act, which had been suspended for ten years prior to that but was used to justify the prevention by southern administrators.
Robertson justified to General Mohamed Naguib, who demanded the abolition of the law banning foreigners from traveling to southern Sudan, that if he did so, it would allow foreigners to enter southern Sudan, including press correspondents, British, Americans, and others, and that would be a disaster for the South because they would then prefer separation from Sudan. However, Mohamed Naguib did not understand Robertson Lloyd’s reasoning, so Zulfikar, who was accompanying Mohamed Naguib, intervened to explain to him in Arabic that lifting the ban was not in the interest of Sudan’s unity or Egypt’s interests, but would contribute to the movement of all foreigners present in Sudan or those who want to enter it, and thus call for the South alone to join the British Commonwealth and separate.
In this meeting, General Mohamed Naguib acknowledged the mistakes of both Salah El-Din and Major Salem in disturbing relations and stirring up the media, and pledged not to interfere in the Sudanese elections
.
*September 1, 1953: Lengthy memorandum from the British Foreign Office on the future of its relations with Sudan in the short and long term
On September 1, 1953, D. Ritchie wrote to W. Morris, head of African and Sudanese Affairs at the British Foreign Office, a lengthy memorandum detailing in points his proposals on British policy towards Sudan in the short and long term after the announcement of an agreement between the Umma Party and Egypt on Nile waters .
This is an important memorandum in which he detailed some British policies in Sudan during that period and after independence. In its conclusion, he emphasized that the issue of Sudan’s entry into the British Commonwealth should not be raised until the Nile Waters Agreement is signed and independence is announced. After that, the Sudanese can apply for Commonwealth membership if they wish .
(Or in short, leave them to their own devices)
Hatim Al-Madani
Former senior foreign Correspondent
@HatimElmadani
