(Darfur 24) news website revealed the paper presented by the Rapid Support Forces at the security and military reform workshop last week that caused the objection of army representatives and their withdrawal.
It stated that “a clause should be included in the constitution on the military’s exclusion from interference in politics, the need for civilian oversight of the military institution, and subjecting the defense budget to review and accountability by parliament.”
It also set out a number of demands, which it considered necessary for the reform process, foremost of which was “the liquidation of the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces from the elements of the former regime and those with ideologies.”
The paper called for “involving the Rapid Support officers in all projects to improve the work environment like their colleagues from the armed forces, improving conditions of service, involving them in solidarity funds and military exercises, and involving the Rapid Support in the the foreign affairs and interests of the state.”
It also considered “the revision of the curricula of the Military Academy as necessary for the reform process in addition to legal and structural reform.”
The army’s objections to the “Rapid Support” paper came because it did not include the timings for integration into the army, whose perceptions revolve around a two-year period of integration in parallel with the armed movements and according to the schedules of security arrangements in the Juba Agreement, and simultaneously the suspension of recruitment, the opening of camps, the cessation of openness and deployment except in coordination with military teams, as well as subjecting the investments of the “Rapid Support” to the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and stopping any external contracts to supply them with weapons, and that this is done through the army.
Calls for demonstrations on the new date for the signing of the political settlement.
The sixth of April marks the date set for the completion of the work of the committees and the signing of the final political agreement, the anniversary of the victory of the revolution in 1985, the entry of the General Command and the sit-in in 2019, and the overthrow of the regime of Omar al-Bashir. There were calls from resistance committees and opposition political parties to demonstrate that day, rejecting the coup and settlement.
The Sudanese Communist Party, the most prominent force of the Radical Change Alliance, said that “the security arrangements contained in the political settlement are rejected.” He stressed the need to “apply well-known international standards in the integration process, which requires the disarmament of militias.”
International and regional interventions
The Prty pointed out that «the current settlement is not based on any constitutional or legal basis due to the absence of the required mandate from the people, therefore, what results from the recommendations of the framework agreement workshop is unconstitutional and non-binding», pointing out that «the work of the workshops themselves witnessed blatant international and regional interference that violated national sovereignty».
Warned, in a statement, that Sudan is “living in serious security conditions that threaten its present, future and unity, due to the ongoing recruitment campaigns to form militias throughout the country.”
These campaigns “stand behind the coup authority with its various components, and with different goals, including the use of these forces as mercenary elements and sending them out of the country, and parties to the Juba Agreement and the Rapid Support seek to increase the number of their recruits in order to benefit from them in the integration processes,” according to the party, which called for “demonstrations on April 6 to overthrow the coup and settle.”
This day also came within the announced schedules of the central processions of the coordination of the resistance committees, which are also leading the anti-coup movement, which rejects the political settlement, considering that it does not meet the “goals of the revolution” raised by them.
Adel Khalaf Allah, a leader in the Arab Socialist Baath Party who rejected the settlement, said that “the repeated setting of deadlines for reaching what was called the political agreement reveals the fact that it is a superior and simplistic perception in a framework crowded with contradictions, in addition to transforming its atmosphere into more buying time and looking forward to obtaining more gains and adjusting the balance of power, especially after legitimizing the coup and immunizing its leader and those with him from accountability.”
He added that “raising differences over issues of security arrangements is a tactic and pressure for the possibility of reaching an agreement that guarantees Burhan and Hemedti the two leading positions during the transitional period.”
He pointed out that “the army and rapid support papers are technical projections of the dispute over power and influence between the coup leader and the rapid support commander and pressure on other parties to find a satisfactory solution for both.”
According to Khalafalla, “the crisis deepened by the October 25 coup, and held by the so-called framework solution, is not solved by compromise and reconciliation,” noting that “the atmosphere, course and prolongation of reaching what they called the final agreement, confirms the reduction of its parties to the complex crisis in power and clinging to it or returning to it.”
That is, «the deliberations of the workshops, issues and recommendations, are nothing more than an immature construction communication that does not live up to the aspirations of the Sudanese people and the principles of the December revolution, due to the conflict of interests and the loss of the elements of unity and harmony».
He expressed his belief that “the leader of the coup Al-Burhan plays on internal and external contradictions to buy time to move after the legalization, from being part of the solution to the axis and basis of the solution, and with international support before it is regional to control and dominate the capabilities of Sudan, and implicate it in normalization with the Zionist enemy, according to the new Middle East plan.”
On the other hand, the leader of the forces of «freedom and change» Central Council Orwa al-Sadiq, that «the dates set earlier, were with the consent of all parties, including the military, until the situation exploded between them and the army representatives withdrew from the workshop of security and military reform, which led to the recent postponement».
On the proposals submitted by the «Freedom and Change» in the framework of addressing the crisis, Orwa explained to the London based «Al-Quds Al-Arabi»: «We submitted proposals during the outbreak of the last crisis and the mobilization of forces by the army and rapid support in the capital, and we called for reducing tension and relying on the voice of wisdom and reason, as we said that the issue of reform and integration must be carried out in accordance with recognized international standards and previous experiences in matters of demobilization and integration of armies».
New alliance
Some accuse the forces of “freedom and change” of allying with the “Rapid Support” and conforming to its vision on integration and reform, and Orwa responds, saying: “Freedom and Change did not ally with the Rapid Support, but there is a correspondence in the positions, the rapid support of the forces that carried out the coup, but its commander returned and said that what happened on October 25 is a coup and this vision agreed with the perceptions of freedom and change.”
He stressed «not to submit special papers in the name of freedom and change in the workshop of security and military reform», pointing out that «all papers came from generals of the security services and former generals, and based on technical opinions, foundations and criteria that are not subject to political bidding».
He pointed out that freedom and change «if you want to fortify the transition will not fortify it with a gun other than the gun of the Sudanese armed forces, nor will it be strengthened by the gun of rapid support or armed movements, this will only be possible through restructuring and reform and access to a single professional national army», pointing out that «some armed forces are against the civil democratic transition and against the completion of the political process».
He revealed that «in the event that the technical committees do not reach recommendations on the issues of integration and reform, there are proposals now being discussed within the forces of freedom and change, that there is no new postponement of the signing of the draft agreement, considering that the draft is agreed upon and there is no dispute about it except in an annex protocol of (5) other protocols».
He pointed out that «it is possible to develop a protocol for military and security reform for further consultation and until a decision is taken to sign the rest of what was stated in the draft with the continuation of consultations to announce the prime minister and the government». He stressed that «the forces of freedom and change are committed to the schedules and the recommendations agreed upon by the workshop», explaining that «if the military institution has other options, they and the rest of the forces signatories to the framework agreement will determine other options».
This article was first published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper.
In Arabic and some of its parts have been translated
